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Beyond the Verdict: Why Courts Must Protect Jurors from 
the Public Before, During, and After High-Profile Cases 
SCOTT RITTER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Early in the summer of 2011, the nation was captivated by the trial of Florida’s 
Casey Anthony.1 Anthony was accused of murdering her two-year-old daughter 
and then disposing of the body, an allegation that provoked intense emotions from 
the American public.2 When Anthony was acquitted in early July,3 those emotions 
spilled over: the verdict was met with outrage.4 
Some of that outrage was directed against the twelve-member body that 
ultimately delivered the acquittal—the jury.5 Though most of the fury nationwide 
was general and impersonal,6 the reaction in Florida hit close to home for some of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Indiana Law Journal Executive Notes & Comments Editor; J.D. Candidate, 2014, 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2007, Illinois State University. This Note 
would not have been possible without the help of a number of people, beginning with my 
friends and colleagues on the Indiana Law Journal. In particular, I must thank Leah Seigel 
for her valuable help in the editing and proofreading process. I am also grateful to Frank 
Carrillo and Eileen Bader for their constant encouragement, and to Alex Zagor and Norm 
Werth for introducing me to this topic what seems like a lifetime ago.  
 1. See, e.g., John Cloud, Casey Anthony: The Social Media Trial of the Century, TIME, 
June 27, 2011, at 42, 43–44 (“[T]he Washington Post and the Miami Herald have become 
the latest major outlets to begin offering live streams of the case. CNN and NBC air so much 
coverage of the trial that the networks each decided to erect a two-story, air-conditioned 
structure in a lot across from the courthouse. The broadcast village around the court often 
grows to hundreds of media vehicles.”); Brian Stelter, Casey Anthony Verdict Brings HLN 
Record Ratings, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (July 6, 2011, 4:18 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/casey-anthony-verdict-brings-hln-record
-ratings/?_r=0 (stating that 5.2 million people watched the reading of the verdict on Headline 
News, a record for the network). 
 2. See Cloud, supra note 1, at 43 (“The sheer horror at the act—and the idea that a 
mother committed it—catapulted the case from local live-at-5 sideshow to tabloid sensation 
(MONSTER MOM PARTYING FOUR DAYS AFTER TOT DIED, one recent report said) to national 
preoccupation.”). 
 3. Stelter, supra note 1.  
 4. See, e.g., Greg Botelho, Emotional, Unsatisfying Ending for Many Tracking 
Anthony Case, CNN (July 5, 2011, 8:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/05
/florida.casey.anthony.reaction/index.html (“As much as the depth of the emotion, the 
breadth of the reaction also matched the much-stated assessment that the Casey Anthony 
case is, thus far, the trial of the 21st century.”); Sharon Tanenbaum, Intense Emotional 
Reactions to the Shocking Casey Anthony Acquittal, EVERYDAY HEALTH (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.everydayhealth.com/emotional-health/0706/intense-emotional-reactions-to-the
-shocking-casey-anthony-acquittal.aspx (chronicling the public’s “disgust, disbelief, and 
disappointment” following the verdict). 
 5. E.g., Botelho, supra note 4. 
 6. See Tanenbaum, supra note 4 (reporting reactions from Twitter).  
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the jurors.7 Immediately following the verdict, an enraged crowd gathered at the 
courthouse, many holding hand-written signs, including ones that read “Juror 1–12 
Guilty of Murder!!!” and “Somewhere a Village is Missing 12 Idiots.”8 A 
restaurant in Clearwater posted a sign that read “Pinellas County jurors NOT 
welcome.”9 But some of the threats went even further: one juror reportedly quit her 
job and fled the state to avoid the animosity she was receiving.10 Other threats to 
jurors were reported to the County Sherriff’s Office, as jurors reported that they felt 
“like prisoners in their own homes” following the verdict.11 
The aftermath of the Casey Anthony verdict illustrates just some of the issues 
faced by jurors serving on a high-profile case. Following the verdict in the Anthony 
case, a number of media outlets12 moved to intervene, seeking the release of juror 
information.13 Such motions are not uncommon when the public (and, therefore, the 
media) takes a certain interest in a case, and may occur before,14 after,15 or even 
during the trial.16 
Those issues were brought to the forefront again two years later when a Florida 
jury found George Zimmerman not guilty of murdering Trayvon Martin.17 
Zimmerman was charged in 2012 with second-degree murder for the shooting 
death of seventeen-year-old, African American Martin, and claimed self-defense 
even though Martin was unarmed at the time.18 The Zimmerman case, largely 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. Florida v. Anthony, No. 48-2008-CF-015606-AO, 2011 WL 3112070, at 1–5 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. July 26, 2011) (order granting in part motion to intervene for the limited purpose of 
seeking release of juror information once jury is discharged and detailing the threats made to 
jurors following the verdict). 
 8. Id. at 4.  
 9. Id. at 4–5 (citing Brad Davis, Clearwater Chili Restaurant Tells Casey Anthony 
Jurors They Are Not Welcome, ABC ACTION NEWS (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/region_north_pinellas/clearwater/clearwater-chili
-restaurant-tells-pinellas-jurors-they-are-not-welcome). 
 10. Id. at 5. The juror reportedly quit her job just months short of retirement because her 
coworkers were upset with the verdict and with her. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. The entities intervening in Florida v. Anthony were the Orlando Sentinel 
Communications Company, WFTV, Inc., Media General Operations, Inc., Times Publishing 
Company, and The Associated Press. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 13. Id. at 1.  
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008) (media intervenors 
challenged pre-trial orders to restrict access to prospective jurors’ names during voir dire and 
to empanel an anonymous jury). 
 15. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell (In re Disclosure of Juror Names and Addresses), 592 
N.W.2d 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (media filed post-verdict motion for disclosure of juror 
information).  
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (media 
intervenors appealed district court ruling of untimeliness as trial was ongoing). 
 17. James Novogrod, Tom Winter, Tracy Connor & Erin McClam, Jury Finds George 
Zimmerman Not Guilty, NBC NEWS (July 16, 2013, 1:40 PM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/13/19441838-jury-finds-george-zimmerman
-not-guilty?lite. 
 18. Martin Savidge, Vivian Kuo, Beth Karas, Jessica Thill & Aletse Mellado, George 
Zimmerman Charged, Hearing Expected Thursday, CNN (Apr. 11, 2012, 10:17 PM), http://
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because of the victim’s age and race, sparked a national controversy.19 After the 
jury returned a verdict of not guilty, some of the ensuing outcry was directed at the 
jury itself.20 Many suggested that people would be “coming after” the jurors in 
retaliation for the unpopular verdict, while others sought out the addresses of the 
six women who served on the jury.21 One Twitter user wrote: “Somebody should 
kill one of the jury members [sic] sons and let the killer free.”22 
Prior to jury selection in the Zimmerman case, Judge Debra Nelson granted the 
defense’s request that jurors’ identities be kept anonymous throughout the trial.23 
Judge Nelson noted that such a step was necessary in order to “to protect the 
prospective jurors from harassment and pressure from the public at large.”24 The 
jurors’ identities and addresses would only be known to the attorneys, “so that they 
may properly inquire during voir dire.”25  
The general disclosure to the public of information from a criminal trial is a 
First Amendment issue, governed by the experience and logic test, as set forth in 
the Supreme Court’s Richmond Newspapers26 and Press-Enterprise cases.27 If that 
test is satisfied with respect to a certain proceeding or aspect of a criminal trial, 
there is a presumption in favor of openness.28 The Supreme Court has never 
specifically addressed the issue of disclosure of juror information.29 Federal 
                                                                                                                 
www.cnn.com/2012/04/11/justice/florida-teen-shooting/index.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Joe Newby, ‘Twitter Lynch Mob’ Targets Zimmerman Jury with Death Threats, 
EXAMINER.COM (July 14, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/twitter-lynch-mob-targets
-zimmerman-jury-with-death-threats (chronicling death threats made against the Zimmerman 
jury). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. The backlash was not limited to semi-anonymous Twitter users, as Atlanta 
Falcons wide receiver also suggested that the jurors “should go home tonight and kill 
themselves.” Roddy White Reacts Harshly to George Zimmerman Verdict on Twitter, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/14
/roddy-white-george-zimmerman-verdict-twitter_n_3593212.html. 
 23. Florida v. Zimmerman, No. 12-CF-1083-A, 2013 WL 2645615, at 1–2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
June 5, 2013) (order directing that jurors’ identities be kept confidential). 
 24. Id. at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (emphasizing the 
importance of experience and tradition in public access cases). 
 27. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 
U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (formally adopting the “experience and logic” test); Press-Enter. Co. v. 
Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 516 (1984) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (“The constitutional protection for the right of access that the Court upholds 
today is found in the First Amendment, rather than the public trial provision of the Sixth.”). 
 28. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.  
 29. Some have suggested that the question of disclosure of jurors’ identifying 
information was settled directly by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise I, where the Court 
held that voir dire transcripts were presumptively open. 464 U.S. at 505. In discussing when 
that presumption may be overcome, the Court noted: “[A] valid privacy right may rise to a 
level that part of the transcript should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect 
the person from embarrassment.” Id. at 512 (emphasis added). Some argue that this passage 
ties the concept of juror names in with the presumption of openness found in that case. See, 
e.g., In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1988); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 
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appellate courts—along with state courts settling the issue on First Amendment 
grounds—however, have had many chances to apply the test to this context, with 
some concluding that the disclosure of jurors’ names and addresses is sufficiently 
grounded in experience and logic, and thus that there is a presumption in favor of 
such disclosure.30  
The waters are muddied further when those courts attempt to determine the 
threshold for overcoming that First Amendment presumption.31 This second level 
of inquiry requires that courts weigh competing concerns in a particular case to 
decide if they outweigh the benefits of disclosure—a method strikingly similar to 
the logic prong of the experience and logic test.32 A similar balancing test has been 
applied by courts following the common law presumption as well.33 Resolution of 
                                                                                                                 
A.2d 735, 754–55 (Del. 1989) (Walsh, J., dissenting). The Wecht court, among others, has 
rejected this reasoning, leaving the issue without Supreme Court precedent. United States v. 
Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 234 n.24 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Although this argument is plausible, we will 
not conclude from a single passage of Supreme Court dicta that the question is decisively 
settled.”); see also Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 901 (Pa. 2007) (“Although this 
argument is appealing in its simplicity, we refuse to elevate a single sentence discussing 
potential limitations on the right of access to voir dire proceedings to signify that the United 
States Supreme Court held that jurors’ names and addresses are part and parcel of voir dire 
itself.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Wecht, 537 F.3d at 238; In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 
N.W.2d 798, 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Bond, 
781 N.E.2d 180, 194 (Ohio 2002); Long, 922 A.2d at 63. This conclusion, however, has been 
far from unanimous, as some courts have found that “experience and logic” dictate no such 
result. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Calabrese, 515 F. Supp. 2d 880, 881–82 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Gannett, 571 A.2d at 737. Still 
other courts have refused to address the issue using the constitutional test, turning instead to 
the common law presumption of openness. See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 
558, 562 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d at 76 n.4.  
 31. Compare United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1362 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring 
particularized findings in order to overcome presumption of openness in an individual case), 
and Wecht, 537 F.3d at 239–40 (requiring “pervasive” risks going beyond mere “conclusory 
and generic” findings), with In re Disclosure, 592 N.W.2d at 809 (“We disagree with the 
Antar court’s requirement that the trial court make ‘particularized findings’ that jurors would 
be endangered if their names were released before restricting media access to the names. 
Only rarely will a trial court have concrete evidence of a potential risk of harm to a juror.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Wecht, 537 F.3d at 239–42. The Wecht court examined the district court’s 
proffered reasons for withholding jurors’ identifications, and dismissed each as failing to 
outweigh the benefits of openness. For example, on the possibility that disclosure may lead 
to harassment of jurors, the court wrote: “[T]his is a necessary cost of the openness of the 
judicial process. The participation of jurors ‘in publicized trials may sometimes force them 
into the limelight against their wishes,’ but ‘[w]e cannot accept the mere generalized privacy 
concerns of jurors’ as a sufficient reason to conceal their identities in every high-profile 
case.” Id. at 240 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Hurley (In re Globe Newspaper 
Co.), 920 F.2d 88, 98 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 33. See Blagojevich, 612 F.3d at 561 (“The right question is not whether names may be 
kept secret, or disclosure deferred, but what justifies such a decision.” (emphasis in 
original)); see also United States v. Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 287 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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this issue has been far from consistent in the many courts to reach it, and no clear 
consensus seems to have emerged.34 
Some scholars have offered solutions for the proper analysis or evidentiary 
threshold at this second tier.35 Others have taken a step backwards and suggested 
that the experience and logic test is improper for this question,36 or that the 
experience and logic test is simply inapplicable.37 Furthermore, some scholarship 
has focused narrowly on the timing of disclosure, rather than the broader issue of 
disclosure as a whole.38 
This Note proposes a more straightforward and comprehensive solution. Under 
the experience and logic test, there should be no constitutional presumption in favor 
of disclosure of information identifying the actual jurors in a criminal trial, 
regardless of the stage of the trial. This should be the case even in the absence of 
actual juror safety concerns.39 The concern for jurors that pervades high-profile 
trials is not allayed simply by waiting until after the verdict is delivered, as 
illustrated by the aftermath of the Casey Anthony and George Zimmerman 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. See Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1739, 1759 (2006) (“[C]ourts often disagree as to which closures satisfy strict scrutiny. 
For some, the test is strict in theory but fatal in fact; for others, searching for a way to justify 
closure, the test is strict in theory but quite flexible in fact.” (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); cases cited supra note 29; cf. Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom 
Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 461, 485–86 (2002) 
(discussing the scattered lower court application of the logic and experience test in all 
contexts). 
 35. See Kaitlin E. Picco, By Any Other Name: The Media’s First Amendment Right of 
Access to Juror Names United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008), 82 TEMP. L. 
REV. 561, 589–91 (2009) (arguing that the “prevalence of the modern media” and juror 
privacy concerns are interests compelling enough to overcome the First Amendment 
presumption, and that reviewing courts should be deferential in this determination). 
 36. See Seth A. Fersko, United States v. Wecht: When Anonymous Juries, the Right of 
Access, and Judicial Discretion Collide, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 763, 788–89 (2010) 
(arguing that the Wecht court “should have attempted to address the Media-Intervenors’ 
access claims under the common-law right-of-access doctrine rather than creating a new 
constitutional right”). 
 37. See Levine, supra note 34; Scott Sholder, “What’s in a Name?”: A Paradigm Shift 
from Press-Enterprise to Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions When Considering the 
Release of Juror-Identifying Information in Criminal Trials, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2009). 
 38. See Sholder, supra note 37, at 104–10 (discussing “The Trial as a Three-Act Play” 
and the strength of rights for the press, the defendant, and jurors in each of those three acts); 
Fersko, supra note 36, at 768 (focusing on identification of prospective jurors at the 
jury-selection stage). 
 39. Where there are specific, articulable concerns for juror safety, courts do not hesitate 
to withhold jurors’ identities. See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 
1988) (affirming district court’s decision not to disclose juror names in Mafia trial); United 
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134–35 (2d Cir. 1979) (withholding identification of 
potential jurors in the interest of safety); see also In re Disclosure of Juror Names & 
Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 799 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“We qualify this right of access by 
also holding that trial courts have discretion . . . in some circumstances, perhaps, to refuse 
disclosure, in order to accommodate all the interests of justice, where safety concerns of 
jurors are found to be legitimate concerns.”).  
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verdicts.40 When a jury fears a public backlash from an unpopular verdict, and that 
fear finds its way into the jury room, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial is compromised. Failure of the experience and logic test is dictated not 
only by the far-reaching negative effects of disclosure of jurors’ names, but also the 
lack of any real benefits of such disclosure. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the Court’s initial adoption of the experience and 
logic test in the Richmond Newspapers and Press-Enterprise II cases, and the 
policy objectives that informed the Court’s decisions. In those and subsequent 
cases, the Court has stressed the importance of fairness in the criminal trial as well 
as the appearance of fairness, with these concepts underlying the broader policy 
goal of public confidence in the criminal justice system.41 With these goals in mind, 
courts have applied the experience and logic test to a variety of aspects of a 
criminal trial.42 
Part III focuses the discussion on one aspect of the criminal trial, the disclosure 
of jurors’ identifying information. The experience and logic test has been applied to 
this context by federal circuit43 and district courts,44 as well state appellate45 and 
supreme courts46 that have decided the disclosure question on First Amendment 
grounds. Analysis of these cases illustrates the examination of history (experience 
prong) and balancing of benefits and countervailing interests (logic prong) that 
courts have applied to the disclosure of juror information. Such an analysis shows 
that lower courts have tended to apply the experience prong in an improper fashion, 
and that, in applying the logic prong, courts have put too much weight on vague 
concerns of appearance of fairness while failing to properly address Sixth 
Amendment fair trial concerns.  
Finally, Part IV argues that the concerns that mandate a failure of the logic 
prong apply to the identities of the actual sitting jurors in a high-profile criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. Florida v. Anthony, No. 48-2008-CF-015606-AO, 2011 WL 3112070, at 1–5 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. July 26, 2011) (order granting in part motion to intervene for the limited purpose of 
seeking release of juror information once jury is discharged). 
 41. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“The value of openness lies in the 
fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness 
are being observed . . . .”); United States v. Hurley (In re Globe Newspaper Co.), 920 F.2d 
88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that openness “assur[es] that proceedings are conducted fairly” 
and “ensur[es] public confidence in a trial’s results through the appearance of fairness”); see 
also Levine, supra note 34, at 1744, 1791–96 (arguing that “[p]ublic scrutiny assures the 
fairness of proceedings” and increases public confidence). 
 42. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (preliminary hearings); United 
States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 239 (3d Cir. 2008) (juror identities); Hartford Courant Co. v. 
Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (court dockets); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (deportation proceedings); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. 
Court for Dist. of Ariz., 156 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1998) (transcripts of closed hearings); United 
States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1994) (post-trial examination of juror for 
potential misconduct). 
 43. E.g., Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695. 
 44. E.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626–29 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 45. E.g., In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 805–06 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
 46. E.g., Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 901 (Pa. 2007).  
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trial—even in the absence of specific, articulable safety concerns—before, during, 
and even after the trial. Despite arguments that there may be more benefits to 
disclosure after the verdict,47 fair trial concerns remain in play. Because these 
concerns caution against the disclosure of juror-identifying information at the post-
trial stage, there should never be a First Amendment presumption of access to 
jurors’ names and addresses in high-profile cases. 
I. DEFINING A “HIGH-PROFILE” TRIAL 
This Note argues that application of the experience and logic test in high-profile 
criminal trials dictates that juror information should not be disclosed to the media 
or the public. Because the scope of the argument is thus limited to only 
“high-profile” trials, it is helpful to first establish a working definition for that term. 
In the most basic sense, “high-profile” refers simply to a high “degree or level of 
public exposure.”48 Of course, in the context of the courtroom, public exposure is 
almost entirely a product of the media’s coverage49—the media, after all, serves as 
the “eyes and ears” of the public.50 The amount of media coverage of a criminal 
trial is causally related to the level of public interest in that trial.51 Regardless of 
which comes first—does the media cultivate the public’s interest in a certain topic, 
or does the media merely reflect the public’s interest?52—there can be no doubt that 
the two go hand in hand.  
Thus there are two main factors that tend to make a trial high profile in nature—
media coverage and public interest. If these elements are the tinder, then the 
public’s passion may be considered the spark that gives rise to the dangers this 
Note addresses. To be sure, the public may be interested in a subject without being 
passionate, and the media may cover subjects that do not ignite passion. But a high-
profile criminal trial is generally not one of those situations. Perhaps in large part 
due to the nature of the alleged crimes that tend to give rise to media-saturated 
trials,53 the public’s interest in such proceedings goes beyond a mere curiosity in 
the outcome.54  
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 991 (11th ed. 2004). 
 49. For further discussion on the importance of the media’s role in the courtroom 
context see infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 50. Sheila S. Coronel, Corruption and the Watchdog Role of the News Media, in PUBLIC 
SENTINEL: NEWS MEDIA & GOVERNANCE REFORM 111 (Pippa Norris ed., 2010). 
 51. See generally Dietram A. Scheufele & David Tewksbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, 
and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models, 57 J. COMM. 9 (2007). 
 52. One prominent model in mass communications scholarship is that of agenda-setting 
theory. See Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Evolution of Agenda-Setting 
Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas, 43 J. COMM. 58 (1993). At its 
core, agenda-setting theory postulates that media coverage determines what events the public 
at large will find most important. See, e.g., Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The 
Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176 (1972). For further 
discussion of media theory, see Stephen D. Reese, Setting the Media’s Agenda: A Power 
Balance Perspective, 14 COMM. Y.B. 309 (1991) (reviewing a wide range of media agenda-
setting studies).  
 53. From the alleged child murder in the Casey Anthony trial, see supra note 1, to 
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The number of trials that meet this rough definition of “high profile” will pale in 
comparison to the number of run-of-the-mill trials that do not.55 In the vast majority 
of cases, there will be little public interest and minimal—if any—media coverage.56 
In such cases, the application of the experience and logic test may be different.57 
Because there is an obvious gray area between trials not covered by the media and 
trials pervaded by a “carnival atmosphere,”58 one obvious issue remains: Where is 
the precise dividing line that sets “high-profile” trials apart from the rest? 
Answering this question with any particularity may be impossible. But the serious 
consequences potentially stemming from disclosure59 certainly caution in favor of a 
liberal interpretation of the term “high profile.”  
II. HISTORY OF THE EXPERIENCE AND LOGIC TEST 
Criminal trials have historically been presumptively open.60 This tradition, 
which goes back to the Norman Conquest of England,61 is further guaranteed in the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, providing the public—and its proxy, the 
                                                                                                                 
multiple counts of alleged child rape in the Jerry Sandusky case, see infra note 203, to the 
alleged racially motivated murder of teenager Trayvon Martin, see supra notes 20–25 and 
accompanying text, examples abound of the public being captivated by shocking charges. 
Even when the charges are not as extraordinary, cases may become highly publicized when 
they involve a high-profile defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 
(7th Cir. 2010) (trial of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich).  
 54. See infra notes 203–06 and accompanying text. While public passion is often for 
conviction, see infra note 185, it can go both ways. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Most 
Americans Believe Charges Against Michael Jackson Probably True, GALLUP (Apr. 29, 
2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/16081/most-americans-believe-charges-against-michael
-jackson-probably-true.aspx (analyzing the strong racial divide in attitudes toward the guilt 
of Michael Jackson and O.J. Simpson). 
 55. In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 808 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (noting that high-profile trials are exceptional). 
 56. Id. (“In the vast majority of trials, there are no safety implications for jurors and the 
media has no interest in reporting the names or comments of jurors.”). 
 57. The question of proper application of the experience and logic test to lower-profile 
trials is beyond the scope of this Note. However, as the Michigan Court of Appeals alluded 
to, the question is often moot—if the media and public have little interest in a trial, not only 
will jurors face no dangers from the public, but there will be no demand for jurors’ 
information in the first place. See id.  
 58. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 577 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring). In Estes, the 
Supreme Court held that the exorbitant amount of media in and around the courthouse—
what the trial judge had referred to as a “circus”—was presumptively prejudicial to the 
defendant. Id. at 532 (majority opinion). The Court reached similar conclusions in Rideau v. 
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), each time 
holding that the cases “had been utterly corrupted by press coverage.” Murphy v. Florida, 
421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975). Though the threshold for a presumed prejudice claim based on 
media presence is quite high, see Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), this 
inquiry is distinct from that of the experience and logic test. 
 59. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 60. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980). 
 61. Id. at 565.  
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media62—the right to access criminal trials.63 This openness, according to the 
Court, serves a wide array of important goals: 
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending 
trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; 
the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that 
established procedures are being followed and that deviations will 
become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the 
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public 
confidence in the system.64 
In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court formally established a test used for 
determining the portions of a criminal trial to which the media is presumptively 
guaranteed a First Amendment right of access.65 Press-Enterprise II stemmed from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. “In new and old democracies, the idea of the media as the public’s eyes and ears, 
and not merely a passive recorder of events, is today widely accepted.” Coronel, supra note 
50, at 112. The notion of the media as the public’s proxy can be seen throughout First 
Amendment access jurisprudence. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586 n.2 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (“As a practical matter . . . the institutional press is the 
likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the ‘agent’ of 
interested citizens, and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals.”); 
United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is well-established that the 
First Amendment protects the right of the public, and the media as its proxy, to have access 
to criminal proceedings and to gather information.”); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 
892, 899 (Pa. 2007) (“[T]he Court also has generally agreed that the right of the press and 
public were synonymous, since the media effectively functions as surrogates for the 
public.”); see also Marc O. Litt, “Citizen-Soldiers” or Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the 
Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media and the 
Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371, 417 (1992) (“Access to 
information about the jury is of great importance to the media in carrying out its role as the 
public’s proxy monitor of trials.”). 
 63. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 556. 
 64. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (emphasis in original); see also 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569–70 (discussing “[t]he nexus between openness, 
fairness, and the perception of fairness”). The Supreme Court’s most succinct review of the 
benefits of openness in the criminal justice system is perhaps Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982): 
[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the 
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of 
the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a 
whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of 
fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. And in the 
broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate 
in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component in 
our structure of self-government. 
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 65. 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). Though the test was first given its name in Press-Enterprise II, 
the same two factors were considered in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573, and that 
case is usually referred to as the starting point for the experience and logic test. See Alice 
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the California trial court’s decision to exclude the public from pretrial proceedings 
in the prosecution of a nurse charged with murdering twelve patients.66 When the 
court subsequently refused the Press-Enterprise Company’s motion to release 
transcripts of the proceedings, Press-Enterprise challenged the decision.67 
The Supreme Court reasoned that tests of experience and logic dictated that 
Press-Enterprise had a presumptive right to the transcripts of the preliminary 
hearing.68 In recognizing the changing nature of media scrutiny, the experience and 
logic test was crafted to strike a “balance between too much and too little public 
access.”69 If both the experience prong and the logic prong are satisfied, a 
First Amendment right attaches, and that aspect of the trial is presumptively open 
to the public and media.70 
Under the experience prong, a court must determine “whether the place and 
process [in question] have been historically open to the press and public.”71 When 
such a tradition is found to exist, the experience prong has been satisfied.72 The 
Court in Richmond Newspapers explained why such experience is integral in 
determining if a current right of access exists: “[T]he case for a right of access has 
special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to 
particular proceedings or information. Such a tradition commands respect in part 
because the Constitution carries the gloss of history.”73 The Court thus concluded 
that “a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.”74 
This analysis often—in Richmond Newspapers and many of the cases to follow—
sees courts searching as far back as the Norman Conquest for a historical 
tradition.75 In some circumstances, a long tradition of a certain practice is found 
easily.76 In others, however, history may provide support for both sides of the 
openness argument.77 
                                                                                                                 
Cole Ortiz, Our “Eternal Struggle Between Liberty and Security:” A First Amendment Right 
of Access to Deportation Hearings, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1203, 1210–15 (2003) (discussing 
the birth of the experience and logic test in Richmond Newspapers). 
 66. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 3–4.  
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. Id. at 8. 
 69. See Fersko, supra note 36, at 767 (arguing that the experience and logic test was 
implemented largely in response to a congressional move to greater judicial discretion in 
access questions). 
 70. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10; see also David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s 
Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1997) (“When the need for openness is justified by the twin tests of ‘experience and logic,’ 
a qualified right of access attaches.”) (footnote omitted). But see Levine, supra note 34, at 
1742, 1747–50 (arguing that Richmond Newspapers does not make clear whether satisfaction 
of just one prong is sufficient). 
 71. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.  
 72. Id. at 10. 
 73. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 565 (discussing the legal system in England both before and after the Norman 
Conquest); see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 505–06 (1984) (beginning at the 
Norman Conquest).  
 76. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565–68 (discussing the absolute 
openness of trials in England and colonial America). The Richmond Newspapers Court 
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In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to explicitly apply 
the experience test to a specific aspect of a criminal trial,78 the Court devoted a 
considerably smaller portion of its opinion to the experience test than to the logic 
test.79 In determining whether preliminary hearings have traditionally been open, 
the Court began by pointing to the 1806 Aaron Burr trial, in which the probable 
cause hearing took place in Virginia’s Hall of the House of Delegates.80 Without 
further discussion, the Court concluded that experience dictated a tradition of 
openness in preliminary hearings,81 and went on to cite numerous state cases 
reaching the same conclusion.82 
While the early applications of the experience and logic test involved trial 
aspects where the tradition of openness was plainly clear, the test has, over time, 
been applied to more complicated issues.83 This has raised the question of how far 
back such experience must reach.84 While the aforementioned analysis in 
Press-Enterprise II made clear that going back to the Norman Conquest is not 
always necessary,85 some courts have examined a much narrower frame of 
history.86 The Sixth Circuit realized that in some cases a shorter time frame makes 
                                                                                                                 
found no evidence that closure of criminal trials was ever the answer in early America:  
Indeed, when in the mid-1600’s the Virginia Assembly felt that the respect due 
the courts was “by the clamorous unmannerlynes of the people lost, and order, 
gravity and decoram which should manifest the authority of a court in the court 
it selfe neglected,” the response was not to restrict the openness of the trials to 
the public, but instead to prescribe rules for the conduct of those attending 
them. 
Id. at 567 (citing ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 132 (1930)). 
 77. United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (examining cases in 
which juror names were not released). The Supreme Court’s early applications of the 
experience prong seemed to recognize that there will always be outliers, but these are 
exceptions rather than the rule, ultimately finding that experience favored openness. See 
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (“[S]everal States following the original New 
York Field Code of Criminal Procedure published in 1850 have allowed preliminary 
hearings to be closed on the motion of the accused. But even in these States the proceedings 
are presumptively open to the public and are closed only for cause shown.” (citation 
omitted)); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 501 (“The historical evidence reveals that the 
process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public process with exceptions only 
for good cause shown.”); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(“Although exceptions may have been allowed, the general policy has been one of 
openness.”).  
 78. The analysis in Richmond Newspapers regarded the history and experience of 
openness in criminal trials generally. 448 U.S. at 556.  
 79. The Court disposed of the experience inquiry in just one paragraph, compared to the 
five dedicated to the logic test. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10–13. 
 80. Id. at 10. 
 81. Id. at 11.  
 82. Id. at 10 n.3 (collecting cases).  
 83. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002) (listing just 
some of the situations in which the experience and logic test has been applied, including 
certain administrative proceedings); see also cases cited supra note 42. 
 84. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700. 
 85. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 78–82.  
 86. See, e.g., Cal–Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
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sense, because “the First Amendment concerns ‘broad principles,’ applicable to 
contexts not known to the Framers[,]”87 while still noting that “[a] historical 
tradition of at least some duration is obviously necessary.”88 
Under the logic prong, a court must examine “whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”89 
When such a role is found to be played, the logic prong has been satisfied.90 The 
Court in Press-Enterprise II looked to benefits generally flowing from openness—
ensuring fairness and impartiality and “the ‘community therapeutic value’ of 
openness”91—and found that openness in preliminary hearings served those goals.92 
More recent applications of the logic prong have followed a similar method.93 Still, 
the Press-Enterprise II Court was sure to point out that these general benefits of 
openness will not always be applicable, identifying the grand jury as an example of 
an aspect of the criminal process that would be “totally frustrated if conducted 
openly.”94  
                                                                                                                 
experience prong satisfied through examination of current state statutes); Apps. of Nat’l 
Broad. Co. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1987) (reviewing history from 1924 to 
1984).  
 87. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. of 
Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)). 
 88. Id. (quoting In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1332 
(D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
 89. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 90. Id. at 11. 
 91. Id. at 13 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 
(1980)). 
 92. Id. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982), 
identified six interests that the Richmond Newspapers Court had found that could be served 
by public access: 
[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the 
public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; [2] 
promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by 
permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] providing a significant 
community therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and 
emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial 
process to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all involved; 
and [6] discouragement of perjury. 
United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) (paraphrasing from Criden, 675 
F.2d at 556).  
 93. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 95 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that 
logic supports public access to docket sheets because, inter alia, “their availability greatly 
enhances the appearance of fairness [and] [t]hey have also been used to reveal potential 
judicial biases or conflicts of interest”); Associated Press v. State, 888 A.2d 1236, 1248 
(N.H. 2005) (finding that logic supports public access to domestic relations proceeding 
because of an enhanced appearance of fairness in important proceedings as well as the need 
to “safeguard[] the integrity of the factfinding process”) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Super. Ct. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)). 
 94. 478 U.S. at 8–9; see United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 238–39 (2008) 
(recognizing drawbacks to disclosure of jurors’ names and addresses, but finding those 
drawbacks outweighed by the “benefits of public access”). In his Richmond Newspapers 
concurrence, Justice Brennan was also concerned that a right of access could theoretically be 
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The logic prong may hold more weight than the experience prong.95 Though 
neither the Richmond Newspapers nor the Press-Enterprise decisions included such 
a suggestion,96 the conclusion does follow from reason. On one hand, it is easy to 
imagine attaching a right of access where a public benefit logically flows from 
openness, despite a lack of traditional openness; on the other hand, it would be a 
perverse result to attach a right of access based solely on tradition if that access had 
dire consequences.97 Others have argued that the logic prong is simply of greater 
inherent value.98 Of course, when it adopted the test, the Court must have suspected 
that the occasion would be rare when the two considerations were diametrically 
opposed.99 
III. APPLICATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND LOGIC TEST TO THE DISCLOSURE OF 
JURORS’ IDENTIFYING INFORMATION 
The experience and logic test has been applied to the disclosure of jurors’ 
identifying information numerous times in a variety of lower courts.100 Generally, 
the identifying information at issue in these cases is the names and addresses of the 
                                                                                                                 
extended ad infinitum based upon the benefits of the public’s access to knowledge generally. 
448 U.S. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). He thus cautioned that the benefits of 
access should be weighed against its drawbacks. Id. at 558–59; see also Levine, supra note 
34, at 1748–49 (discussing Brennan’s concurrence). 
 95. See United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding First 
Amendment right of access based solely on a logic prong analysis). The Criden court also 
explicitly refused to factor history or experience into the equation, though that decision was 
delivered in 1982, before the Richmond Newspapers test had been given its formal name. 
675 F.2d at 555 (“We do not think that historical analysis is relevant in determining whether 
there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings.”). 
 96. See Levine, supra note 34, at 1777 (pointing out the disagreement among lower 
courts over the relative weight of each prong). See generally Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1; 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.  
 97. See Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 1540, 1552 (1983) (“[H]istory should play a limited role in defining the scope of the 
right to attend judicial proceedings. Notwithstanding ‘the favorable judgment of experience’ 
and ‘the gloss of history’ that the Constitution carries, the Court should avoid a rigid 
historical interpretation of the [F]irst [A]mendment when the result would offend the 
amendment’s underlying purposes.” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 
(Brennan, J., concurring))).  
 98. See Douglas A. Bahr, Associated Press v. Bradshaw: The Right of Press Access 
Extended to Juvenile Proceedings in South Dakota, 34 S.D. L. REV. 738, 754 n.156 (1989) 
(arguing that “the ‘logic’ prong should carry more weight”); Harry Todd, The Right of 
Access and Juvenile Delinquency Hearings: The Future of Confidentiality, 16 IND. L. REV. 
911, 935–36 (1983) (suggesting that historical review will be of little value where the history 
of a certain proceeding is not of sufficient length). 
 99. Cf. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 9 (referring to the two “complementary” 
notions of experience and logic as “of course, related, for history and experience shape the 
functioning of governmental processes”); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (“[A] tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 100. See cases cited supra note 30. 
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jurors,101 though some courts have taken a unique stance on just what information 
is involved.102 Courts are largely divided as to the result of the experience and logic 
test in this context,103 though the most recent federal court of appeals to address the 
issue ultimately found that a qualified First Amendment right of access to juror 
information does exist.104 
Three key considerations must be kept in mind when analyzing the decisions on 
this issue. First, each court to apply the experience and logic test to the disclosure 
of juror information does so only in the narrow context in which the claim arises.105 
Often this means that instead of deciding if the media has a qualified right to the 
information generally, courts decide whether such a right exists, for example, 
pretrial,106 pre-verdict,107 or even post-verdict (without deciding whether the right 
exists during trial).108 The analyses of both experience and logic then are framed 
only in this narrow context. 
Second, when a court finds that experience and logic favor a qualified right of 
access, it proceeds to the second tier of analysis: whether a compelling interest has 
been asserted that justifies closure.109 This means that the court essentially has two 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1351 (3d Cir. 1994); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93 n.6 
(1st Cir. 1990) (“In the case of many familiar names, an address as well as the name is 
necessary to identify the individual.”). 
 102. See Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 904 (Pa. 2007) (holding that a qualified 
First Amendment right applies to disclosure of juror names, but not addresses); see also Litt, 
supra note 62, at 410 n.253 (arguing that the court in Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 518 N.E.2d 930, 
931–33 (N.Y. 1987), implied that the right of access was limited to names alone). 
 103. See supra note 30. 
 104. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 238–39. 
 105. See generally Sholder, supra note 37, at 104–10 (discussing the three stages of 
criminal trials and the unique factors examined by courts applying the test at each stage). 
 106. E.g., Wecht, 537 F.3d at 239 (finding that the presumptive First Amendment right 
“attaches no later than the swearing and empanelment of the jury”). 
 107. E.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (addressing 
issue of whether media has “a constitutional right to learn the jurors’ names before the jury 
returns its verdict”). 
 108. E.g., In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 809 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (“We therefore hold that the press has a qualified right of post-verdict access to 
juror names and addresses . . . .”). 
 109. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (indicating that the presumptive 
First Amendment right may be overcome when there is “an overriding interest based on 
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest”); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1358 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing the 
burden for overcoming the presumptive First Amendment right in the juror disclosure 
context). This modified strict scrutiny standard, to be applied following a positive 
application of the experience and logic test, has encountered multiple interpretations. See 
Levine, supra note 34, at 1759 (“[C]ourts often disagree as to which closures satisfy strict 
scrutiny. For some, the test is strict in theory but fatal in fact; for others, searching for a way 
to justify closure, the test is strict in theory but quite flexible in fact.” (footnote and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Sholder, supra note 37, at 121–23 (discussing variations in strict 
scrutiny analysis in access cases). Even within the narrower bounds of the juror disclosure 
issue, courts have tended to disagree. See cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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opportunities to find in favor of closure. It is possible that courts will be more 
inclined to reach this tier, where it may rule based upon the facts of the individual 
case, rather than issue a precedent-setting denial of a constitutional right at the 
experience and logic stage.110 
Finally, the issue here is separate and distinct from the issue of anonymous 
juries.111 An anonymous jury refers to the withholding of jurors’ identifying 
information from the parties.112 The cases discussed in this Part—and the thesis of 
this Note in general—refer only to disclosure to the public/media.113 While the 
history of truly anonymous juries may sometimes be discussed in experience prong 
analysis,114 the concept of an anonymous jury is wholly distinct from the issue of 
disclosure to the media and public.  
A. The Experience Prong 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied the experience and logic test to 
pre-empanelment disclosure of jurors’ name and addresses in United States v. 
Wecht.115 The Wecht appeal stemmed from a pretrial petition from a group of 
media-intervenors challenging district court orders to empanel an anonymous jury 
and to conduct initial voir dire through a questionnaire, without venire persons 
                                                                                                                 
For the purposes of this Note, however, delving into this legal morass is unnecessary. 
Because the disclosure of jurors’ identifying information at any stage of the trial should not 
satisfy the experience and logic test, there is no need to proceed to the second stage. 
 110. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a 
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the 
Court will decide only the latter.”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of 
Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (holding that the Supreme Court shall “never . . . 
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it 
is to be applied”).  
 111. See Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (differentiating anonymous juries). 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (anonymous 
jury empaneled “by ordering that the names, addresses, and places of employment of 
prospective jurors and their spouses not be disclosed to counsel, either before or after 
selection of the jury panel”); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(“[T]he trial judge granted the government’s motion to empanel an anonymous jury. During 
voir dire neither party was permitted to learn the jurors’ names, residence addresses, or 
places of employment.”); see generally Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the 
Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123 (1996) 
(discussing “anonymous juries” in terms of disclosure to the parties). Despite this clear case 
law, some scholarship uses the term “anonymous jury” very broadly, encompassing even 
those situations where jurors’ identities are disclosed to the parties, but not the public. See, 
e.g., Fersko, supra note 36, at 769–70. 
 113. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 751 (Del. 1989) (finding that 
disclosure of identities to the press and the public “promotes neither the fairness nor the 
perception of fairness, when the parties are provided with the jurors’ names and all 
proceedings are open to the public”). 
 114. E.g., United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
history of “anonymous juries”). 
 115. Id. at 235–39. 
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actually present in the court.116 The defendant, Dr. Cyril Wecht, was the 
Allegheny County coroner, and was charged with eighty-four counts of theft and 
fraud.117 The district court judge, noting that Wecht, a prominent person locally, 
was concerned that the jury’s exposure to the media might be harmful.118 
In its experience prong analysis, the Wecht court found that there was a 
historical tradition of access to juror names.119 The court followed the lead of the 
early Supreme Court cases120 by examining history in the broadest possible scope, 
looking at “trial practices as they have developed over the past millennium in 
courts at all levels.”121 Using this scope for its historical analysis, the Third Circuit 
found particularly significant the fact that juries were traditionally chosen from 
smaller local populations.122 “Because juries have historically been selected from 
local populations in which most people have known each other . . . the traditional 
public nature of voir dire strongly suggests that jurors’ identities were public as 
well.”123 The Third Circuit also found it significant that the withholding of jurors’ 
names was especially rare before the 1970s,124 concluding: “[I]t appears that public 
knowledge of jurors’ names is a well-established part of American judicial 
tradition.”125 
In Commonwealth v. Long, the trial court, near the end of the trial and 
sua sponte, announced that the names and addresses of the jurors would not be 
revealed.126 The defendant, Karl Long, had been accused of murdering his wife.127 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Id. at 224–25. 
 117. Id. at 224.  
 118. Id. at 240–41. Specifically, the district court was concerned “that the dissemination 
of stories about the prospective jurors (and especially the empaneled jury) would have a real 
impact on the jurors’ willingness to serve and, if selected, on the jurors’ abilities to remain 
fair, unbiased, and focused on [the] case.” Id. at 240. The court also showed concern for 
possible attempts by Wecht’s friends or enemies to influence the jury. Id. 
 119. Id. at 235–38. 
 120. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 121. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 237. 
 122. See id. at 235. 
 123. Id. The court then cited with approval a number of scholarly articles indicating that 
jurors’ names were traditionally known, including Weinstein, supra note 70 at 30 (“The 
names of jurors have been available to the public throughout the history of the common 
law.”), and Robert Lloyd Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror’s Identity: 
Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury’s Deliberative Process, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 357, 
370 (1990) (“An examination of historical tradition indicates that jurors’ identities and 
places of residence traditionally have been known to the public.”). Wecht, 537 F.3d at 235–
36. 
 124. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 236. 
 125. Id.; cf. In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) (“When the jury system 
grew up with juries of the vicinage, everybody knew everybody on the jury . . . . But the 
anonymity of life in the cities has so changed the complexion of this country that even the 
press, with its vast and imaginative methods of obtaining information, apparently does not 
know and cannot easily obtain the names of the jurors . . . . We think it no more than an 
application of what has always been the law to require a district court . . . to release the 
names and addresses of those jurors who are sitting . . . .”). 
 126. 922 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. 2007). 
 127. Id. at 894. 
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Recognizing that the trial was a “widely publicized and sensationalized event,” the 
trial court cited concerns for jurors’ privacy in withholding the names and 
addresses.128 The media intervened five days later, before the jury had returned a 
verdict.129  
Though the situation was technically different from that in Wecht, in that the 
court was addressing a midtrial rather than a pretrial request, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania’s analysis under the experience prong was virtually identical to that 
of the Third Circuit.130 “Looking at the earliest juries,” the court concluded in Long, 
“there can be no question that jurors’ names and addresses were generally 
known.”131 Though the Pennsylvania high court explicitly rejected the idea that 
“everybody knew everybody on the jury,”132 it still found a historical tradition 
based upon the practice of calling jurors forward by name.133  
Proper analysis under the experience prong would seem to turn on the precise 
phrasing of the issue. The Wecht court found a historical tradition of “public 
knowledge” of jurors’ identities,134 rather than a historical tradition of courts 
actively disclosing such information. The Long court, perhaps recognizing this 
distinction, rested its experience prong decision on the tradition of juror names 
being announced in court,135 even though this tradition is markedly different from 
the type of formal disclosure sought by intervenors in these cases. At the very least, 
though, because the experience prong requires a history of disclosure of jurors’ 
identities, the Wecht court’s “everybody knows everybody” rationale must fail. 
Experience prong analysis of the disclosure of juror identities also hinges upon 
some of the unanswered questions following Richmond Newspapers and 
Press-Enterprise II: How far back must the historical tradition go?136 And just how 
much countervailing tradition is necessary to defeat the experience prong?137 While 
the Wecht court found examples of the withholding of juror information to be “very 
rare” prior to 1970,138 the practice became considerably more common in the 
history after that point in time.139 Looking at the past forty years, one could easily 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Id. at 905. 
 129. See id. at 895. 
 130. Like the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania traced the earliest 
iterations of the jury, citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & THOMAS M. COOLEY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1899), at length. Long, 922 A.2d at 901–02. 
 131. 922 A.2d at 901. 
 132. Id. at 902. Despite a discussion that would lead to this conclusion, the court 
ultimately found that increasing populations and changes in the jury system refuted the idea. 
Id. (“Thus, to simply conclude that jurors’ names and addresses were public knowledge 
because ‘everybody knew everybody on the jury’ ignores the historical evolution of the jury 
system.”). 
 133. Id. at 902–03. Resting its experience prong decision on these grounds largely 
explains why the Long court found a presumptive First Amendment right to juror names, but 
not addresses. See id. at 903–04; see also supra note 77. 
 134. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 135. 922 A.2d at 902–03. 
 136. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 138. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 236. 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The 
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conclude that it is fairly common practice for a trial judge to order that juror 
information be kept from the public.140 Furthermore, the changes in media and 
media technology over the last forty years tend to indicate that more weight should 
be put on the recent history, not less.141 Whether or not this truncated history 
counterbalances the Long rationale142 remains an open question, so a conclusion 
that experience must favor disclosure is tenuous at best. This question is generally 
moot,143 however, as the disclosure of jurors’ identifying information fails the logic 
prong on multiple levels.  
B. The Logic Prong 
The Wecht court also found that logic favored the pre-empanelment disclosure 
of jurors’ name and addresses.144 The court concluded that “the purposes served by 
the openness of trials and voir dire generally are also served by public access to 
jurors’ names.”145 Specifically, the Wecht court found that pretrial disclosure of 
jurors’ names and addresses would allow the public to “verify the impartiality” of 
jurors, which “ensures fairness, the appearance of fairness and public 
                                                                                                                 
refusal to direct that the names and addresses of the jurors be publicly released was well 
within the bounds of such discretion.” (footnote omitted)); Sanders v. Indianapolis (In re 
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc.), 837 F. Supp. 956, 957 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (“It has been the 
operating procedure and long-standing policy of this Court not to disclose to persons, other 
than the parties to a particular litigation, the names and addresses of a jury panel until after 
that panel has completed its term of service.”). The Federal Plan for Random Jury Selection, 
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2006), may also go against a history of juror identity disclosure. The 
statute, passed in 1968, allows each district to implement a plan for jury selection, and 
dictates: “If the plan permits these names to be made public, it may nevertheless permit the 
chief judge of the district court, or such other district court judge as the plan may provide, to 
keep these names confidential in any case where the interests of justice so require.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (emphasis added). Some courts have incorporated this statute into the 
experience prong analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625–26 
(N.D. Ill. 2007); see also Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 744 (Del. 1989) (arguing that 
experience analysis should be broadly inclusive); Fersko, supra note 36, at 773 (arguing that 
the jury selection statute was intended to codify existing judicial practices).  
 140. See Fersko, supra note 36, at 788 (arguing that the Wecht court erred in essentially 
ignoring more recent trends affording trial judges more discretion over release of jurors’ 
names). 
 141. See id. at 791 (arguing that courts should take greater account of modern trends in 
the experience prong analysis); see also Wecht, 537 F.3d at 255–56 (Van Antwerpen, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Given the increased media presence and role in 
judicial proceedings, the collective experience of courts over the last few decades in 
managing high-profile trials is arguably more relevant than is the early development of the 
jury system on which the Majority bases its holding that jurors [sic] names were known to 
the public as a matter of experience.”). The Supreme Court addressed this issue as early as 
1966, discussing the increasing pervasiveness of media coverage of the judicial process in 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966).  
 142. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Wecht, 537 F.3d at 239. 
 145. Id. at 238. 
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confidence.”146 Beyond this, the court reasoned that the power to decide a criminal 
defendant’s fate should not be a power exercised by unknown persons.147 
The Third Circuit did recognize three risks that flow from juror identity 
disclosure.148 First, public disclosure of juror names creates the possibility that 
friends or enemies of the defendant may seek to influence a juror’s decision-
making process.149 Second, prospective jurors may seek to avoid jury duty for fear 
that they will be harassed by the media.150 Finally, prospective jurors may have 
incentive to lie in voir dire, in order to avoid publication of embarrassing secrets.151 
Ultimately, though, the court did not find these possible risks compelling enough to 
outweigh the aforementioned benefits of disclosure.152 
Examining pre-verdict (but after empanelment) and post-verdict disclosure of 
juror information, other courts have reached similar conclusions on the logic 
prong.153 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Long (pre-verdict) relied in part on 
the positive effects of openness and access to the criminal justice system,154 quoting 
at length the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper.155 
Additionally, the Long court—like the Third Circuit in Wecht—found that public 
knowledge of jurors’ names would serve as a check on bias, further finding that this 
would in turn motivate potential jurors to be more honest and forthright in the first 
place at voir dire.156 Though it did consider the potential concerns for juror safety, 
harassment from the media, and the possibility that these concerns would make 
people less willing to participate in jury service,157 the Long court ultimately 
concluded that these concerns were outweighed by “the objective of a fair trial to 
the defendant and . . . assurances of fairness to society as a whole.”158  
In In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
analyzed the post-verdict disclosure of juror information.159 The defendant in the 
case that gave rise to In re Disclosure was Ervin Dewain Mitchell, who was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. Id. (quoting In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 147. Id. Once again quoting the First Circuit’s In re Globe decision, the Wecht court 
stated: “[T]he prospect of criminal justice being routinely meted out by unknown persons 
does not comport with democratic values of accountability and openness.” Id. 
 148. See id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 239 (“[W]e are satisfied that district judges are well-positioned to address 
these risks on a case-by-case basis, and in such cases, to make particularized findings on the 
record . . . .”). 
 153. Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 903–04 (Pa. 2007) (finding a right of access 
to impaneled jurors’ names); In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 
798, 808–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (finding a qualified right of post-verdict access to jurors’ 
names and addresses). 
 154. See 922 A.2d at 903–04. 
 155. Id. at 899, 903–04 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk 
Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)). 
 156. Long, 922 A.2d at 904.  
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 905. 
 159. 592 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
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charged with counts of felony murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct in 
Ann Arbor, Michigan.160 The crimes in the college town were covered extensively, 
with the media referring to the assailant as the “Ann Arbor serial rapist.”161 
Referring to the case as “the most highly publicized case this County has had in 
decades,” the trial court took steps during the trial to protect the jurors’ identities.162 
Before a verdict was reached, the Detroit Free Press intervened, requesting that the 
court release the jurors’ names and addresses after the verdict was announced.163 
The court denied the request, noting that any jurors who wished to speak to the 
media remained free to do so.164 
The Michigan Court of Appeals pointed out the possibility that but for some 
qualified First Amendment right of access to juror information, “a court could, with 
unlimited discretion, totally conceal the identity of jurors and thus create the 
impression of a secret process.”165 Though the In re Disclosure court did put more 
emphasis on the drawbacks of disclosure than the previous courts,166 it still found 
that these concerns would only occur rarely and could be addressed when they 
arose.167  
The disclosure of juror-identifying information should fail the logic prong of the 
experience and logic test, and should do so for two distinct reasons. First, it is 
fallacious to say that such disclosure has any positive effects.168 Many of the 
benefits identified by the courts amount to nothing more than wishful thinking. 
Second, even if these benefits are to be taken at face value, they are nevertheless 
dramatically outweighed by the many harmful effects of disclosure,169 not the least 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Id. at 799. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 799–800. 
 163. Id. at 800. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 808.  
 166. See id. at 809. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted specifically that safety 
concerns should warrant stronger safeguards than mere privacy concerns, and that “concrete 
evidence” of such safety concerns is rarely available, but also that a jury’s subjective 
concerns alone should not be enough to bar or delay disclosure. Id. The Michigan court was 
also one of the very few to discuss safety concerns in terms of post-verdict retaliation, rather 
than in terms of midtrial attempts to influence. Id. at 808–09; see also infra Part III.B.2. 
 167. 592 N.W.2d at 808–09. The In re Disclosure court purported to compromise when it 
listed the dangers of juror information disclosure, then held only a “qualified” right existed, 
“subject to the trial court’s discretion” to address concerns, should they come up, and make 
specific findings. Id. at 809. Of course, the experience and logic test was never intended to 
confer an unqualified right, see Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986), but a qualified one 
that can be defeated only with specific findings. Id. at 9–10.  
 168. See United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 120 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The usefulness of 
releasing jurors’ names appears to us highly questionable.”); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 
735, 751 (Del. 1989) (“Contrary to the rather pietistic claims of Gannett and its amici curiae, 
there is nothing to suggest that [withholding juror information] undermined public trust in 
the judicial system.”). 
 169. See infra Part III.B.2; see also N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 
217 (3d Cir. 2002) (pointing out that “to gauge accurately whether a role is positive, the 
calculus must perforce take account of the flip side—the extent to which openness impairs 
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of which is the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, which may be 
compromised in a number of ways.170  
1. No Significant Benefits Flow from the Disclosure of Juror- 
Identifying Information 
While the idea that public knowledge will ensure impartiality and accountability 
is sound when it comes to broader concepts within the criminal justice system, it is 
a flawed argument when it comes to issues concerning the high-profile adversarial 
trial.171 Whatever the source or strength of a juror’s bias, that bias, usually, will 
only direct the juror in one of two directions in a criminal trial: guilt or innocence. 
Thus, at least one of the parties, the prosecution or the defense, will very much 
have an interest in rooting out this bias itself. The entire process of voir dire, of 
course, is devoted to this issue,172 and either party may continue to be on the 
lookout for partiality even after voir dire has ended.173 Indeed, when so much is at 
stake, investigation of the jurors by both parties is an in-depth and ongoing task.174 
                                                                                                                 
the public good,” and that “were the logic prong only to determine whether openness serves 
some good, it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would 
not have a First Amendment right of access”). 
 170. See infra Part III.B.2; see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“No 
right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial.”). 
 171. See Fersko, supra note 36, at 803–04 (arguing that “jurors are not accountable to the 
public in the same way as judges and elected officials”). Unlike judges, prosecutors, or other 
public officials, jurors serve once, making it impossible for them to somehow craft a 
tyrannical regime over time: “[J]urors obtain their power at random, and when jurors give up 
their power, they ‘inconspicuously fade back into the community.’” Id. at 804 (quoting 
United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988)); cf. 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 653 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 
1991) (1833) (“The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to guard against a spirit 
of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers . . . .”). 
 172. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (noting that the selection of an 
impartial jury is the main goal of the voir dire process). With adversarial parties each seeking 
to avoid bias or partiality in the other side’s favor, voir dire is sufficient for meeting the goal 
of impartiality, without the help of the public. See United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 
618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (allowing for withholding of jurors’ names where voir dire 
remained open to the public and media, and where parties received names of potential 
jurors); see also Fersko, supra note 36, at 805 (arguing that voir dire is an acceptable 
alternative to disclosure of jurors’ names); cf. Edwards, 823 F.2d at 120 (finding that the 
substance of transcripts of midtrial proceedings involving questioning of jurors was 
sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment, and therefore the redaction of actual jurors’ names 
was allowed).  
 173. See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Background Checks for Jurors?, 94 ILL. B.J. 278 (2006) 
(discussing the benefits and potential drawbacks of background checks for jurors); Caren 
Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 4, 9 
(noting that “[b]ackground checks on jurors are becoming commonplace, particularly in 
high-profile or violent crime cases,” and that “[s]ome lawyers are coming to jury selection 
armed with a phalanx of paralegals to run each juror’s name through a variety of social 
media searches in real time”).  
 174. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a 
Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 613–14, 620–27 (2012) (discussing the investigation of jurors 
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As one scholar put it, “[I]f the voir dire process has a flaw because the parties are 
unable to conduct a proper investigation, then the system should not rely on the 
media to fix the flaw. Instead, the system should fix the flaw.”175  
The public as a detector of bias would then be, at best, a prophylactic measure 
beyond the functions of the parties themselves. But even this concept is flawed, for 
there is no reason to believe that the public (including the media) has the ability or 
motivation to go beyond anything the parties might uncover.176 It is the goal of 
media entities to sell newspapers or advertising, not to ensure that a trial is fair.177 
While the media may have more resources at its disposal than the general public, 
there is no indication that these resources would exceed those of the prosecution or 
defense in a high-profile case.178  
The argument that public knowledge of juror information contributes to the 
public’s “perception of fairness” in the justice system is also without merit. The 
general notion that openness serves this end is certainly a legitimate one, as 
systemic issues can only be addressed through public knowledge and discussion.179 
But there must be exceptions to this rule.180 It is hard to imagine—and no court has 
                                                                                                                 
after voir dire, from the use of private detectives to modern comprehensive Internet 
background checks); see also Tricam Indus., Inc. v. Coba, 100 So. 3d 105, 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012) (finding lack of due diligence where plaintiff’s counsel ignored trial judge’s 
advice to run background checks on jurors prior to deliberation). 
 175. Fersko, supra note 36, at 805; see Picco, supra note 35, at 583 (arguing that “the 
parties and courts, rather than the public, should be primarily responsible” for ensuring an 
impartial jury). 
 176. The court in United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725 n.7 (D. Mass. 1987), 
for one, expressed skepticism that the media would use juror information for the benefit of 
the justice system. The court criticized the intervenor’s argument in favor of access:  
[T]his is little more than an argument that it wants the information to sell more 
papers. While this is hardly an ignoble end, it flies in the face of the historic 
traditions of the courts, [and] does nothing to enhance the jury system (in fact, 
it may harm it through undue inquiry into the jury’s deliberations) . . . . 
Id. 
 177. See Fersko, supra note 36, at 805 (arguing that reliance “on the media to scrutinize 
the jurors for problems is speculative at best”). The trial judge in the Antar case put these 
concerns as bluntly as possible when denying the intervenors’ motion to unseal the voir dire 
transcript: “The fact is, and courts should candidly recognize it, that the invasion of the jury 
system by the press is only, and I repeat only, designed to sell newspapers.” United States v. 
Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D.N.J. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 38 F.3d 1348 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 178. See, e.g., Anthony Colarossi, Casey Anthony Trial Costs: How Much She’ll Pay Is 
up to Judge, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 2, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-09
-02/news/os-casey-anthony-prosecution-costs-hearing-20110902_1_casey-anthony-cheney
-mason-jose-baez (stating that the government spent more than $500,000 investigating and 
prosecuting Casey Anthony). 
 179. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,” and that openness in criminal justice serves the antecedent assumption that such 
debate must be informed (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
 180. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (singling out the grand jury as an 
example of the kind “of government operation[] that would be totally frustrated if conducted 
openly”); United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 260 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he [Black] court 
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identified—a situation where the public suspects something unfair happened in a 
trial solely because it does not know the names and addresses of the jurors. A 
public understanding of the adversarial system and the voir dire process should be 
enough to alleviate any of the public’s concerns.181 
2. Disclosure of Juror-Identifying Information in a High-Profile Trial  
May Cause a Number of Negative Results 
At bottom, the logic prong analysis is nothing more than a simple balancing of 
pros and cons.182 And while the alleged benefits of disclosure are dubious and 
vague, the countervailing concerns are serious and concrete.  
Many courts and scholars have discussed the potential for friends or enemies of 
the defendant to attempt to influence the jury during trial, thus compromising the 
integrity of the jury.183 But as the Casey Anthony case illustrates, the problem can 
be far broader.184 In high-profile cases, especially those that stir the emotions of the 
                                                                                                                 
noted that open access to juror names did not achieve the same effect of vindicating the 
public’s right to oversee judicial proceedings as did requiring the process itself to be 
available to public scrutiny.” (citing United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007))). Similar to the grand jury, secrecy has traditionally been a part of the petit jury 
system. See Fersko, supra note 36 at 803–804, 804 nn.254–55 (arguing that criminal juries 
work best when insulated from “outside pressures,” and examining the English history 
behind this argument). 
 181. The remaining general benefits of openness, see supra note 92, are inapplicable to 
the issue of juror-identifying information. The “community therapeutic value,” id., concerns 
the crime itself, and no argument has been made that knowledge of juror identities can 
somehow help the public cope. As for the performance-enhancement benefit, some have 
actually argued disclosure hinders the jury’s performance. See, e.g., supra note 176. 
Likewise, the general benefit of avoiding perjury is also turned on its ear, as disclosure may 
actually encourage potential jurors to lie during voir dire. See, e.g., Wecht, 537 F.3d at 257–
58 (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 182. See N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(calling for a balancing between benefits and drawbacks in logic prong analysis). 
 183. See Wecht, 537 F.3d at 238 (discussing possibility that friends or enemies of the 
accused might attempt to influence the jury); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 904 
(Pa. 2007) (noting that a citizen will be less likely to serve if “the defendant’s family and 
friends know where he or she lives”); Fersko, supra note 36, at 798 (“Access to jurors’ 
names in high-profile cases poses the risk that a friend or enemy of the defendant will 
intimidate the jurors . . . .”); King, supra note 112, at 126–30 (discussing jurors’ fears largely 
stemming from friends and associates of defendants). 
 184. See Florida v. Anthony, No. 48-2008-CF-015606-AO, 2011 WL 3112070 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. July 26, 2011) (order granting in part motion to intervene for the limited purpose of 
seeking release of juror information once jury is discharged and detailing the threats made to 
jurors following the verdict). Such concerns stemming from public reaction to a case should 
be taken more seriously than those from the friends or enemies of the defendant, because out 
of a greater sample of people, the likelihood is mathematically greater that someone will 
follow through on a threat. Concerns remain that the public reaction to the Anthony verdict 
could have a chilling effect on jury service. Karen Sloan, Jury Experts Fret About Backlash 
Against Casey Anthony Jurors, NAT’L L.J. (July 13, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj
/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202500796607&Jury_experts_fret_about_backlash_against_Casey
_Anthony_jurors. 
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public, the public will tend to favor a certain outcome—usually conviction.185 In 
Florida, when the jury delivered a verdict scorned by the public, jurors faced threats 
and harassment.186 In a close case, a juror might factor this expected public 
response into his or her decision, even subconsciously, seeking to personally avoid 
such a backlash. When this outside factor plays even a small role in the jury room, 
the defendant’s rights under the Constitution are compromised,187 and avoiding 
such compromise should be the utmost concern of the courts.188  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an impartial 
jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution.189 This pillar of due process ensures 
that juries in criminal cases will base their conclusions only upon “evidence and 
argument in open court,”190 without any internal191 or external192 influences. This 
right protected by the Sixth Amendment has been called the “underlying principle 
of the United States’ justice system.”193 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. See Darlene Ricker, Holding Out, 78 A.B.A. J. 48 (1992) (detailing public reactions 
to acquittals in high-profile cases); Priscilla Benfield, Being Tried and Convicted in the 
Court of Public Opinion, YAHOO! (July 9, 2011), http://voices.yahoo.com/being-tried-
convicted-court-public-opinion-8773721.html (blaming the backlash from the acquittal and 
dismissal, respectively, in the high-profile cases of Casey Anthony and Dominic-Strauss 
Kahn on the public’s preconceptions of guilt); Paul Duggan, Casey Anthony and the Court of 
Public Opinion, WASH. POST (July 5, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-
05/local/35236428_1_media-assassination-casey-anthony-caylee (detailing the public 
demand for a guilty verdict in the Anthony Case). Perhaps illustrative of this tendency, a 
Google search for “convicted in the court of public opinion” yields more than four times as 
many results as a similar search that replaces “convicted” with “acquitted.” 
 186. Anthony, 2011 WL 3112070, at *3–6.  
 187. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (“Due Process requires 
that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.”). While 
fair trial issues fuel the argument in this Note, the actual safety concerns that give rise to the 
fair trial argument are certainly a drawback to disclosure in and of themselves. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 905 (Pa. 2007) (discussing juror safety). 
 188. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Disclosure of Juror Identities to the Press: Who Will Speak 
for the Jurors?, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 8 (2009) (citing Press-Enterprise I, 
464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984)) (calling the fair trial right “an interest of unparalleled 
magnitude”).  
 189. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment applies to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 190. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 439 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
 191. An internal influence refers to a juror’s (or potential juror’s) inherent personal 
biases. These biases may exist outside of the direct context of the case at hand, such as a 
juror’s predisposition to side with (or against) the government. See United States v. Robbins, 
500 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1974) (also discussing a juror’s inherent mistrust of the medical 
profession).  
 192. These external influences may include “private talk or public print.” Mu’Min, 500 
U.S. at 439 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 193. Litt, supra note 62, at 374; see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) 
(citing Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)) (referring to the requirement of an 
impartial jury as a “constitutional standard of fairness”). 
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A great number of cases involving the intersection of the media and the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights address the issue of jurors drawing 
conclusions of guilt based upon the amount and nature of media coverage.194 In 
these cases, the influence of the media upon the jury is examined for fundamental 
unfairness based upon a totality of the circumstances.195 Though these concerns 
arise in high-profile cases, they are separate and distinct from the concerns 
stemming from disclosure of jurors’ names and addresses. While cases such as 
Murphy and Sheppard deal with the ways in which the jury may be influenced by 
the media, this Note deals with the ways in which the jury may be influenced by the 
public. Specifically, a juror concerned about the backlash he or she may face from 
the public in response to an acquittal may be more inclined to find a defendant 
guilty—a clear violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.196 
As a practical matter, the threshold for impeaching a verdict based on juror 
impartiality is high.197 These difficulties are compounded by the fact that juror bias 
will be extremely difficult to detect,198 and even the juror herself may be unaware 
of it.199 But these difficulties in identifying and correcting juror biases provide all 
the more reason to safeguard against such biases where there is an opportunity to 
do so. The potential inclination, be it conscious or subconscious, for a juror to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See, e.g., Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 333 (1966); 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 577–78 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Rideau v. 
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 723 (1963). 
 195. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798−99 (synthesizing cases). 
 196. See, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 678 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f even a single 
juror’s impartiality is overcome by an improper extraneous influence, the accused has been 
deprived of the right to an impartial jury.”); see also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 
(1966) (per curiam) (“[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial 
and unprejudiced jurors.”). 
 197. Allegations of juror impartiality discovered only after the delivery of the verdict are 
subject to a “hearing to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident and its effect 
on the jury.” Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954). “A trial court’s findings of 
juror impartiality may ‘be overturned only for manifest error.’” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 428 
(quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)). For more on the inherent difficulties 
and strict rules (including evidentiary thresholds) governing Remmer hearings, see James W. 
Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 389 (1991) and KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, 1 FED. 
JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 9:9 (6th ed. 2013) (“Given that the secrecy of jury deliberations is at 
the heart of the jury system, Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence generally 
prohibits a juror from impeaching his or her verdict.” (citations omitted)). 
 198. See, e.g., United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
see also Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? 
Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179 
(2003) (arguing that traditional voir dire is ineffective in weeding out juror bias). 
 199. E.g., Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (“Bias or prejudice is 
such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always 
recognize its existence, and it might exist in the mind of one . . . who was quite positive that 
he had no bias . . . .”); see also Kimberly Wise, Peering Into the Judicial Magic Eight Ball: 
Arbitrary Decisions in the Area of Juror Removal, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 813, 828 (2009) 
(“Research indicates that jurors may not realize the depth or extent of their own bias . . . .”). 
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incorporate his or her own safety concerns into deliberations can easily be avoided 
if the juror is assured that his or her identity will be protected from the public. 
The aftermath of the George Zimmerman trial is only the most recent example 
of a strongly negative public reaction to a verdict. When police officers were 
acquitted in the Rodney King case, some jurors received “taunts, threats, and 
disturbing phone calls.”200 The jury that acquitted O.J. Simpson was notoriously 
criticized.201 Sometimes the threats come from the other side, as they did for the 
jurors who convicted Dan White for the murder of Harvey Milk.202 Other recent 
cases, such as that of Jerry Sandusky,203 serve as examples of cases that have stirred 
the emotions of the public on a national level.204 These cases may illustrate a trend. 
As media coverage changes and increases, it may lead to more widespread 
emotional reaction from the public at large.205 Given these concerns, jurors need to 
be shielded from public backlash to ensure a fair trial.206 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. King, supra note 112, at 127–28 (citing Sally Ogle Davis, The Last Angry Woman: 
Why King Trial Juror Linda Miller No Longer Believes in Truth, Justice and the American 
Way, L.A. MAG., July 1992, at 58, 58–64). 
 201. See generally Gerald F. Uelman, Jury-Bashing and the O.J. Simpson Verdict, 20 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 475 (1997) (detailing the extreme negative reaction to the Simpson 
jury); see also King, supra note 112, at 129 n.31 (detailing cases in which the integrity of 
jurors was attacked “by those who [could not] accept the verdict”). 
 202. King, supra note 112, at 128 (“Some of these jurors moved or changed jobs after 
their trial. One slept with an axe; another bought a gun.”). 
 203. On October 9, 2012, Jerry Sandusky, a former Penn State assistant football coach, 
was sentenced to thirty to sixty years in prison for sexually abusing young boys. Sandusky’s 
crimes “exacted a tremendous toll” on the Penn State football program, the university, and 
the community. Tim Rohan, Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 Years for Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 2012, at A1; see also Stephen Marche, Why Sandusky’s Punishment Will Never Be 
Enough, ESQUIRE CULTURE BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 3:26 PM), http://www.esquire.com
/blogs/culture/jerry-sandusky-verdict-13541635 (“The anger this case has provoked is 
breathtaking.”). The Sandusky conviction was widely considered to be an “easy call,” see 
Joe Drape & Nate Taylor, Juror Says Panel Had Little Doubt on Sandusky’s Guilt, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/sports/ncaafootball/no-doubt-
about-jerry-sanduskys-guilt-juror-says.html?_r=0, but one can imagine the public pressure a 
juror might feel in a close case. 
 204. More cases will likely create such a reaction from the public at a subnational or local 
level. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 29. 
 205. See KATHERINE S. WILLIAMS, Effects of Media on Public Perceptions of Crime, in 
TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINOLOGY 60, 60–61 (6th ed., 2012) (describing the three main ways in 
which media may affect public opinions); cf. Cloud, supra note 1 (describing how emerging 
social media fueled the public furor in the Casey Anthony case); Debra S. Frank, Preparing 
for a Media Onslaught, L.A. LAW, July–Aug. 2008, at 64 (asserting that “the media are more 
aggressive than ever before”). 
 206. It is, of course, very possible that some jurors would remain clearheaded even in the 
face of noise outside the courtroom. However, the possibility that a juror might engage in 
self-protection by delivering the public’s desired verdict is far from unfathomable. 
Especially considering the utter lack of benefits to disclosing juror information, see supra 
Part III.B.1, it makes great sense to not even run that risk.  
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Though concerns for juror privacy are a tertiary concern after Sixth Amendment 
and juror safety concerns,207 they should nevertheless be taken seriously. The 
concern that a juror will be harassed by the media is real,208 and becomes more so 
as the face of the media changes in the twenty-first century.209 For example, Kaitlin 
Picco has explained the rise of the blogger in the courtroom, and the effect this new 
media source can have on jurors.210 Operating outside of traditional journalistic 
ethics—and without the oversight of an editorial newsroom—bloggers are free to 
be more zealous in their coverage of jurors.211  
There are thus three main concerns that accompany the disclosure of juror 
information: ensuring a fair trial, protecting jurors’ safety, and protecting jurors’ 
privacy. Balanced against the serious lack of benefits flowing from such 
disclosure,212 it is clear that such disclosure does not play a “significant positive 
role in the functioning” of a jury.213 The disclosure of jurors’ identifying 
information therefore fails the experience and logic test.  
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S EXPERIENCE AND LOGIC TEST REQUIRES NO 
DISCLOSURE OF JUROR-IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AT ANY STAGE OF A HIGH-
PROFILE CRIMINAL TRIAL 
As discussed above, the experience and logic test as applied to the disclosure of 
juror-identifying information regards only a specific phase of the trial.214 The 
Wecht court held that the qualified right of access applies before empanelment.215 
The Long216 and In re Disclosure217 courts held that the right applies at least post-
verdict. Many courts that have applied the experience and logic test at earlier stages 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 809 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999). Of course, privacy concerns may also have fair trial implications, insofar as they 
influence a juror’s vote. If a juror expects that an unwelcome or unexpected verdict will lead 
to intense scrutiny from the media (regardless of a threat from the public), the risk is run that 
this may factor into his or her decision making. Here, however, “privacy concerns” refer 
only to the potential for media harassment after a trial, independent of any effect the specter 
of such harassment may have had in the jury room.  
 208. See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding jury 
anonymity in order to “insulate [the jury] from media harassment”); King, supra note 112, at 
129 (detailing instances of harassment by the media). 
 209. See generally John Dimmick, Yan Chen & Zhan Li, Competition Between the 
Internet and Traditional News Media: The Gratification-Opportunities Niche Dimension, 17 
J. MEDIA ECON. 19 (2004) (discussing the role of the Internet in the landscape of modern 
news reporting); see also Picco, supra note 35, at 569–70 (detailing the changing nature of 
media in the courtroom context). 
 210. Picco, supra note 35, at 569–71. 
 211. Id. at 570 (noting that “juror privacy abuse has the potential to grow considerably”). 
 212. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 213. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 214. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 215. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 239 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 216. Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 904–05 (Pa. 2007). 
 217. In re Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 799 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
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have worked under the assumption that, at the very least, juror identifying 
information must be released at some point.218 Many scholars agree.219 Yet the 
experience and logic test requires no such result. Juror disclosure fails the logic 
prong in the context of post-verdict disclosure; thus, a fortiori, juror disclosure 
must fail the logic prong at earlier stages as well.220 There should be no First 
Amendment right to juror identifying information before, during, or after the trial. 
The common assumption that juror names must be released after the verdict 
seems to rely on the notion that the above concerns carry significantly less force 
once the proceedings are complete.221 This notion is incorrect. Under the logic 
prong analysis discussed above,222 a juror’s knowledge that his or her identity will 
be released at any point carries with it the potential to affect the jury’s deliberation 
process. The goal of freeing the jurors’ minds from outside pressures in high-
profile cases may theoretically be reached only by promising to withhold their 
identities from the press and public, even if their names and addresses later are 
disclosed. But this is surely an unjust strategy, and one that would work only 
once.223 
Robert Lloyd Raskopf has argued that the immense benefits of post-trial 
interviews with jurors suffices for the attachment of a First Amendment right of 
access to juror-identifying information.224 Raskopf argues that such interviews 
allow the public to gain a full appreciation of the process and assure the public that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. The Wecht court, for example, relied on this assumption, dismissing the potential 
risks of juror disclosure at the pre-empanelment stage in part because those same risks would 
remain prevalent even after the trial. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 238 n.29; see also Picco, supra note 
35, at 569 (finding that “the vast majority of courts” disclose juror names once a trial is 
complete); cf. United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Neither the 
Supreme Court nor this circuit has decided under what circumstances, and after what 
procedures, jurors’ names may be kept confidential until the trial’s end.”); In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[S]tronger reasons to withhold juror names 
and addresses will often exist during a trial than after a verdict is rendered. After the verdict, 
release normally would seem less likely to harm the rights of the particular accuseds to a fair 
trial.” (emphasis in original)). 
 219. See, e.g., Fersko, supra note 36, at 804–06 (arguing that a presumptive right should 
not attach pre-empanelment, but should attach at least after trial); Litt, supra note 62, at 418 
(“Balancing the three competing bundles of constitutional rights at the post-trial stage is not 
as difficult as in the first two stages.”); Picco, supra note 35, at 582 (“Although there should 
be a qualified First Amendment right to juror names, this right should not attach until after 
the trial has concluded and the risks to juror privacy have lessened.”); Raskopf, supra 
note 123, at 370–75 (extolling the benefits of post-verdict access to jurors). 
 220. The conclusion that no presumptive right of access attaches post-trial forecloses the 
possibility that one could attach earlier. Affording discretion to the trial judge at the post-
trial stage would be meaningless if he or she were forced to disclose the jurors’ names earlier 
in the proceeding. 
 221. See, e.g., Sholder, supra note 37, at 109 (arguing that the accused’s fair trial rights 
are relatively insignificant because “the defendant presumably has had a fair trial”). 
 222. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 223. Cf. United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 724 (D. Mass. 1987) (discussing 
protection at the post-trial stage for its effect on future trials). 
 224. See Raskopf, supra note 123, at 371–74. 
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justice has been done.225 But the notion that an interview with a juror will 
demonstrate that justice has been done (evocative of the “perception of fairness” 
benefit226) is flawed. Any solace the public could take in an interview must come 
from the content of an interview, not simply that an interview was completed.227 
And of course, it also relies upon the juror telling the truth in the interview.228 
Similarly, Marc Litt has argued that “[i]f access continued to be denied post-
trial, the media would never have the opportunity to exercise its right to gather and 
report news on the justice system.”229 But the arguments of Raskopf and Litt seem 
to conflate access to names with mandatory juror interviews. If the identities of 
jurors are released, jurors are still free to turn down interview requests;230 if the 
identities of jurors are withheld, jurors are still free to approach the media of their 
own volition.231 A presumptive right of access to juror-identifying information 
means nothing if jurors do not consent to interviews. A right of access at this stage, 
therefore, lacks any real benefits, and certainly not enough to outweigh a possible 
compromise of a defendant’s fair trial right. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. Id. at 371. 
 226. See supra note 64. 
 227. The idea that a full appreciation of the criminal justice system can be attained 
through interviews with jurors is nebulous and recalls questions about the true motivations of 
the media. See supra note 177 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Simone, 14 
F.3d 833, 846 (3d Cir. 1994) (Garth, J., dissenting) (“In the post-trial context, even the press 
itself has recognized that the media’s zeal . . . does not center on a concern for litigants’ 
rights to a fair trial, but rather on a desire for human-interest accounts of deliberative 
proceedings as ends in themselves, written to sell papers.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 228. For example, after the 2005 acquittal of Michael Jackson on charges of child 
molestation, two jurors came forward to say they believed Jackson was guilty and regretted 
their votes to acquit. 2 Jurors Say They Regret Jackson’s Acquittal, TODAY (Aug. 9, 2005, 
9:23 AM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/8880663/ns/today-entertainment/t/jurors-say
-they-regret-jacksons-acquittal/#.UOfDUpjkhUQ. These comments came months after one 
of the same jurors stated in an interview that he believed Jackson was not guilty. Id. The 
interview had no effect on the verdict. Id. 
 229. Litt, supra note 62, at 419. 
 230. Even in this situation though, the media still holds a lot of power in its relationship 
with jurors. See Melilli, supra note 188, at 13–14 (“[I]t is naïve to believe that every other 
television station, radio station, and newspaper will learn of the juror’s refusal and 
understand and accept that the refusal is general and not limited to just the folks at [the first 
media entity]. Finally, it is even more ‘unlikely’ that there would be ‘a more-or-less polite 
request from the media seeking comment, followed by a similarly polite media retreat in the 
face of a flat “no.”’ ‘Even if a juror declines to be interviewed, the news media can 
nonetheless force that reluctant juror into the spotlight.’” (quoting United States v. 
Calabrese, 515 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2007))).  
 231. Orders simply prohibiting juror interviews are usually found to be unconstitutional 
prior restraints. See, e.g., Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 
1986) (holding prohibition on post-verdict interviews with jurors was an unconstitutional 
prior restraint and that the court could have instead “told the jurors not to discuss the specific 
votes and opinions of noninterviewed jurors”); see also United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 
907, 914–15 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that refusal to allow media inspection of documents 
containing juror-identifying information is not a prior restraint). 
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CONCLUSION 
Criminal trials in the United States have traditionally been open to the media 
and the public, a tradition protected by the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial as well as the First Amendment rights of the media. Despite this general 
openness, not every possible aspect of a criminal trial may be accessed by the 
outside world. To determine which portions of a trial are presumptively open to the 
public, the Supreme Court has adopted the experience and logic test. If a certain 
facet of the criminal trial has historically been open, and if that public access serves 
to benefit the functioning of the process, then a presumptive First Amendment right 
of access attaches to that facet of the trial. 
This experience and logic test is the proper vehicle for determining if, and when, 
the media has a right of access to the identifying information of jurors on criminal 
trials. Often, this information is simply the jurors’ names and addresses. Media 
requests for juror information naturally arise most frequently in so-called “high-
profile” cases, where the public is particularly interested in the proceedings. While 
satisfaction here of the experience prong is tenuous at best, the release of juror 
information does not satisfy the logic prong of the experience and logic test. The 
release of such information fails to serve any benefit that cannot be accomplished 
better by the court and the parties. Furthermore, the risk in high-profile trials that a 
publicly known jury could be pressured by the public, either implicitly or 
explicitly, to reach a certain result is far too great. 
The right of the defendant to a fair trial is perhaps the most important right at 
stake in a criminal trial. It is certainly valued higher than the media’s First 
Amendment rights. Protection of this right, therefore, should not be compromised. 
When a juror knows that his or her name and address will be made public even 
after the trial, he or she has motivation not to deliver a verdict that will upset the 
public. The possibility that a juror may act, even slightly, on such motivation 
mandates that juror names and addresses not be revealed even once the trial is 
complete. The experience and logic test, therefore, does not attach any First 
Amendment right of access to juror-identifying information before, during, or after 
a criminal trial. 
